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THE SCHOLAR
[O]ver the course of 400 years of our history, the people of the
Northern Mariana Islands District have experienced the dominance
of... foreign powers .... By virtue of annexation or conquest, and
without any consultation and consideration, our lives, homes, lands,
culture, and traditions were abruptly and drastically changed. Never
was there an opportunity for our people to have the right to speak
out on the important matters which faced them, such as the nature of
their government, the development of their country and their future
destiny. But this is now coming to an end.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands is comprised of a
chain of fourteen islands in the western Pacific Ocean.2 Since their dis-
covery by Spain in 1592, several nations have ruled over the Islands and
its inhabitants.3 Throughout the various occupations by Spain, Germany,
Japan, and the United States, the Islands' economic and living conditions
remained, for the most part, unstable and underdeveloped.4 After four
centuries of colonization, however, the Islands sought a democratic form
1. Marianas Political Status Negotiation, Opening Round (1972), reprinted in To Ap-
prove "The Convenant to Establish a Conmonvealth of The Northern Mariana Islands,"
and for Other Purposes: Hearing on H.J. Res. 549, H.J. Res. 550, and H.J. Res. 547 Before
the House Subcommittee on Territorial and Insular Affairs of the House Conln. On Interior
and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. 136 (1975) [hereinafter Marianas Political Status
Negotiation, Opening Round] (Welcoming Address of Senator Edward D.L.G. Pangclinan,
Chairman of the Marianas Political Status Commission) (on file with the author).
2. See Victoria King, Comment, The Commonwealth of the Northern Marlana Islands'
Rights Under United States and International Law to Control its Exchsive Economic Zone,
13 U. HAW. L. REV. 477, 480 (1991); Lydia Camacho-Romisher, The Regulatory Life Cycle
and Regulatory Concerns for the Utilities of the Northern Mariana Islands, 40 NAT. RE.
SOtRcms J. 569, 574 (2000).
3. See ARNOLD H. LEIBowrrz, DEFINING SrATus, A COMPREIIVNSIVE ANALYSIS OF
UNITED STATES TERRITORIAL RELATIONS 481 (1990); King, supra note 2, at 480-482; see
also William H. Stewart, The Commoniwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands: Helpful
Facts and Information at http://www.saipan.com/cnmiinfo/info-pg2htm (last visited Sept.
28, 2000). The indigenous peoples of the Northern Mariana Islands are known as Chamor-
ros and their original home is unclear. See id. Some say they migrated from somewhere in
Malaysia, while other historians found these people to be "seafaring Vikings who had lost
their way and were marooned on the islands." See id. After a revolt against their Spanish
colonizers, what was left of the Chamorro people were sent to Guam, an island south of
the Northern Mariana Islands, where the Spanish government was headquartered. See
King, supra note 2, at 481. The Carolinians were the first of the indigenous population to
return to the NMI. See id. The Carolinians settled on the Islands when their Island-the
Caroline Islands-were damaged by a strong typhoon. See id. Eventually, the Chamorros
returned to the Northern Mariana Islands. See id. As a result, two distinct cultural ethnici-
ties reside in the Northern Marianas. See id.
4. See LEinowrrz, supra note 3, at 523-26.
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of government that would ensure the political freedom long absent dur-
ing the Islands' colonial history.5 Thus, when the opportunity to establish
a political relationship with the United States arose, the Northern Mari-
ana Islands became eager participants in the process that would
culminate in the Islands' status as a United States Commonwealth.
In keeping with the Northern Mariana Islands' objectives, the Chair-
man of the Political Status Commission stated: "these negotiations reflect
the high value which we place on the freedoms and democratic form of
government which mark the American political system. We want a gov-
ernment which assures these rights and freedoms and which recognizes
the fundamental equality of all men under the law."6 Hence, the political
relationship between the United States and the Northern Mariana Islands
was formed under the Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands, hereinafter the "Covenant."7
The Islands have benefited both economically and politically from their
Commonwealth status.8 The United States has not only provided mil-
lions of dollars to boost the Islands' struggling economy, but it has also
managed the Islands' foreign affairs and defense.9
5. See Marianas Political Status Negotiations, Opening Round, supra note 1.
6. Marianas Political Status Negotiations, Fifth Session (1974). reprinted in To Ap-
prove "The Covenant to Establish a Conmoniwealth of The Northern Mariana Islands," and
for Other Purposes: Hearing on H.J. Res. 549, HJ. 550, and IIJ. Res. 547 Before the hlouse
Subcommittee on Territorial and Insular Affairs of the House Conu,. On Interior and Insu-
lar Affairs, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. 230-31 (1975) [hereinafter Marianas Political Status Negoti-
ations, Fifth Session] (Welcoming Address of Senator Edward DLG. Pangelinan, Chairman
of the Marianas Political Status Commission) (on file with the author).
7. See Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, 48
U.S.C.A. § 1801 (Vest 2000). Covenant is defined as a "binding agreement like a con-
tract" thus appropriate because the relationship between the United States and the North-
ern Mariana Islands will be a permanent one, which cannot be altered by any party without
the consent of the other. See To Approve "The Covenant to Establish a Comnmonwealth of
The Northern Mariana Islands," and for Other Purposes: Hearing on Hi. Res. 549. Hi.
550, and H.J. Res. 547 Before the House Subcommittee on Territorial and Insular Affairs of
the House Conm. On Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. 627 (1975) (section-
by-section analysis) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Hearing on Hi. Res. 549, i.J.
550, and H.J. Res. 547].
8. See Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, 48
U.S.C.A. § 1801 art. VII, § 702 (West Supp. 2000). The Covenant stated that the United
States would furnish financial aid to the Islands for the seven years following the effective
date of the Covenant, which amounted to over $70 million in aid from 1996 through 2002.
See id.
9. See id. § 1801, art. I, § 104 (indicating that the United States will have complete
authority with respect to matters relating to foreign affairs and defense affecting the North-
ern Mariana Islands); Peter Bergsman, The Marianas, The United States and The United
Nations: The Uncertain Status of the New, American Commonwealth, 6 CAi. W. lI'r't. LJ.
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Although the Islands' political relationship with the United States has
conferred many benefits, the trappings of this newfound democracy did
not come without a price. In becoming a United States Commonwealth,
the Islands surrendered certain elements of their sovereignty. 10 Just how
much sovereignty was surrendered continues to cause discord between
the Northern Mariana Islands and the United States." Although the
United States claims to possess virtually absolute sovereignty over the
Islands, the Islands contend that a limited right to local self-government
remains intact.'2 Furthermore, although the Covenant does provide for
United States sovereignty over the Islands, it also specifically calls for the
Islands to retain a degree of local'self-government.13
This comment traces the history of the Covenant and examines the cur-
rent political relationship between the United States and the Islands.
Part II delineates the Northern Mariana Islands history from colonization
to its recent political status with the United States. Part III discusses the
Covenant's fundamental provisions and the judiciary's interpretation of
the Covenant. Particularly, Part III analyzes the United States' sover-
eignty over the Islands and the safeguards of the mutual consent provi-
sion. Part IV reflects on America's expansionist past by examining the
history of United States' relations with Native Americans and the Native
Hawai'ians. Specifically, Part IV compares Native American and Native
Hawai'ians opposition to American sovereignty to the current situation
on the Northern Mariana Islands.
Part V of this comment explores recent legislation introduced by Con-
gress, which includes both the Covenant Implementation Act' 4 and the
Made in USA Label Defense Act.'5 The Covenant Implementation Act
382, 398 (1976) (finding that the Covenant furnished the United States full control of Mari-
anas foreign affairs).
10. See Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, 48
U.S.C.A § 1801 art. I, § 101 (West Supp. 2000) (providing that the Northern Mariana Is-
lands would be "in political union with and under the sovereignty of the United States of
America").
11. See Justice Ramon G. Villagomez, Address at the 1994 Conference on U.S. Fed-
eral-Insular Areas Relations (May 26, 1994) (transcript on file with the author). Justice
Villagomez was Associate Justice for the Commonwealth Northern Mariana Islands Su-
preme Court from 1989 through 1997, as well as a designated judge for the Federal District
Court in Saipan from February 1986 to May 1989.
12. See id.
13. Compare Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Is-
lands, 48 U.S.C.A. § 1801, art. I, § 101 (West Supp. 2000), with 48 U.S.C.A. § 1801, art. I,
§ 103 (West Supp. 2000).
14. See Northern Mariana Islands Covenant Implementation Act, S. 1052, 106th
Cong. (2000), WL 1999 CONG US S 1052 (1998).
15. See Made in USA Label Defense Act of 1999, S. 922, 106th Cong. § 7 (1999);
Made in USA Label Defense Act of 1999, HR 1621, 106th Cong.§ 7-8 (1999); Government
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would impose the United States immigration laws on the Islands usurping
the current local control. 16 The United States is also considering the
Made in USA Label Defense Act. This federal legislation imposes re-
strictions and tariffs on textile products manufactured in the Islands. 7
Aside from the disastrous effect, these acts will have on the Islands' econ-
omy, they additionally infringe on the Islands right to self-governance.' 8
Finally, Part VI calls for the courts as well as Congress to defer to the
negotiating history documents of the Covenant when interpreting or pro-
posing legislation over the Islands. The documents reflect the clear
promises by the United States to uphold the Island's request for self-
government.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Colonization under Spain, Germany and Japan
It is unclear exactly how the Spaniards stumbled upon the Northern
Mariana Islands. History tells of the Spanish explorer Magellan discover-
ing the Islands while its inhabitants lived peacefully among themselves.' 9
Press Release, Abraham Unveils Legislation to Protect Integrity of tile Made in USA La-
bel (Apr. 29, 1999), available at 1999 WL 2223684.
16. See Northern Mariana Islands Covenant Implementation Act, S. 1052, 106th
Cong. § 1(6)(1), WL 1999 CONG US S 1052 S. RL,. No. 105-201 (1998) (detailing that
Congress seeks to implement federal control over local immigration by amending the Cov-
enant to transfer local immigration control to the United States; Imigration atd Labor
Problems in Mariana Testimony Regarding S. 1052 Before the Senate Energy and Natural
Resources Conun., 105th Cong. (1999) (statement of Juan N. Babuta, Resident Rep., Com-
monwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands), available at 1999 WL 27594416 [hereinafter
Statement of Juan B. Babuta] (indicating that the passage of Senate Bill 1052 would abolish
all local control of immigration decisions).
17. See Made in USA Label Defense Act of 1999, S. 922, 106th Cong. § 7 (1999);
Made in USA Label Defense Act of 1999, HR 1621, 106th Cong. § 7-8 (1999); Government
Press Release, supra note 15; John Hall, Congress Eyeing Bill to End Tariff Dodging China
Labeling Garments 'Made in USA,' Ricti. Ti hns DISPATCH, July 17,2000, at Al. available
at 2000 WL 5042990.
18. See generally Statement of Juan N. Babauta, supra note 16 (warning that the pas-
sage of the Covenant Implementation Act would take all decisions affecting immigration
away from the Islands and to the United States); Ertending U.S. Immigration & Wage
Laws to Marianas Connonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands: Hearing on S. 1100 and
S. 1275 Before the Comnmnittee on Energy amid Natural Resources, 105th Cong. (1998) (Posi-
tion Paper Submitted by House of Representatives Eleventh Commonwealth of the North-
ern Mariana Islands), available at 1998 WL 18089833 thereinafter Position Paper]
(indicating that the imposition of United States immigration laws and restriction on the
USA label would return the islands to dependency on federal grants and aids).
19. See LEIaowrTz, supra note 3, at 485; Stewart, supra note 3. Spain christened the
isles "Las Marianas" after the King of Spain's widow, Mariana of Austria. See id. The
indigenous population was nearly wiped out by its Spanish colonizers when the colonists
committed genocide against the Chamorro people. See id.
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In comparison with other Colonizers, Spain's colonization of the Islands
was the lengthiest.20 However, Spain's objectives for the Islands were
extremely limited.2 It sought only to institute Christianity and to use the
Islands as a way station for Spanish ships.22 Despite these limited objec-
tives, the Spanish did manage to nearly eliminate the local Chamorro
race through acts of genocide in the Seventeenth century.23
In 1899, during the Spanish-American War, Spain sold the Islands to
Germany. 24 Germany colonized the Islands briefly25 and instituted agri-
culture, fishing, and copra26 and coconut production to sustain the Is-
lands' economy.27 Unfortunately, Germany's commercialization of the
Islands came at the expense of the indigenous population.28
After Germany lost World War I, the Japanese gained control of the
Islands under a League of Nations mandate.29 For thirty years, the indig-
enous population was at the mercy of the Japanese, who required them to
speak only in Japanese and to labor in the sugarcane fields.3"
During the Japanese administration of the Islands, Japanese civilians
outnumbered the indigenous population.31 The Japanese established a
sugar and molasses industry and cultivated copra and coffee for Japan's
20. See LEIBOWITZ, supra note 3, at 483-487 (detailing the colonization of Micronesia
by Spain, Germany, and Japan); Stewart, supra note 3 (establishing that Spain colonized
the islands from 1521 until 1899).
21. See LEIBowrrz, supra note 3, at 525 (relating that Spain's objectives for the islands
included porting Spanish ships and converting natives to their religion).
22. See id.
23. See DONALD F. McHENRY, MICRONESIA: TimST BETRAYED 5 (1975); Stewart,
supra note 3.
24. See Stewart, supra note 3. The oppression of the indigenous people under Gor-
many's colonization remained unchanged from the previous colonizer. See id. Although
public schools were built, the natives were taught only in German and forced to plant
coconut trees or face harsh punishment. See id.
25. See LEIBowIrz, supra note 3, at 523-25 (detailing that the German occupation
began in 1899 and lasted until 1914 when the Japanese began occupying the Islands).
26. Copra is the dried kernels of the coconut. See 'iuE CONCISE Oxi-oD DIcHrlON.
ARY 254 (8th ed. 1990).
27. See CNMI Gov'T HISTORY AND POLITICS, at http:Ilvww.mariana-islands.gov.mp/
history.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2001).
28. See LEIBOWITZ, supra note 3, at 485; see Justice Ramon G. Villagomez, supra note
11.
29. See Marybeth Herald, The Northern Marian Islands: A Change in Course Under
Its Covenant with the United States, 71 OR. L, REV. 127, 131 (1992).
30. See Telephone Interview with Rosa Lizma Taisacan, Resident of the Northern Ma-
riana Islands (Oct. 1, 1999) (transcript on file with the author) (relating her personal expe-
rience as a young woman during Japanese colonization).
31. See LEIovrIZ, supra note 3, at 486 n.10 (indicating that in 1937, the Japanese
outnumbered the Micronesians by almost 10,000).
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own economic benefit.32 Although the Japanese established additional
educational institutions, classes were taught only in Japanese and Island-
ers were permitted only limited participation.33 After World War II, Ja-
pan was forced to surrender its prized possession,3' and the Northern
Mariana Islands came under the auspices of the United Nations.
35
B. Pre-Covenant Status: The Northern Mariana Islands as a Trust
Territory
The United States' relationship with the Northern Mariana Islands be-
gan when American forces took control of the Islands after thirty years of
Japanese occupation.36 President Truman refused annexation and sub-
jected the Islands to the United Nations' trusteeship system.37
The trust, known as the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, provided
for the supervision of formerly mandated territories.3" President Truman
wanted the Islands designated as a "strategic trust" because of the Is-
lands' advantageous location in the Pacific.3 9 Aside from the Northern
Mariana Islands, the Trust included five other districts (Pohnpei, Truk,
Yap,4" Marshals, and Palau4 ) collectively known as the Micronesian
Islands.42
32. See id. at 526 (providing a historical background of the Islands during Japanese
occupation).
33. See id.
34. See id. (stating that the Marianas "had served the Japanese as bases for protection
of their most vital communication lines and as bases for their attacks and conquests
throughout the Pacific").
35. See, id. at 487.
36. See Bergsman, supra note 9, at 384; Stewart, supra note 3.
37. See Jon Hinck, Comment, The Republic of Palau and the United States: Self-Deter-
mination Becomes the Price of Free Association, 78 CAL L Rrv. 915, 920 (1990).
38. See id. at 920-21.
39. See LEIBOWITZ, supra note 3, at 487. Leibowitz provides insight into the United
States' motives for its interest in the Islands. He comments that the United States per-
ceived the Islands as important but insignificant in economic value. See id. United States
representative to the United Nations Security Council stated: "We have here islands that in
many instances are nothing but sandpits. Our sole interest in them is security." /d. See,
e.g., D. Michael Green, Anerica's Strategic Trusteeship Dilemma: Its thunanitarian Obliga-
tions, 9 TEX. INT'L L.J. 19,20-21 (1974); Arnold H. Leibowitz, Article, The Marianas Cove-
nant Negotiations, 4 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 19, 19 n.3 (1981); Hinck, supra note 37, at 920.
40. Pohnpei, Truk, and Yap are now known as the "Federated States of Micronesia."
See LEIuowrrz, supra note 3, at 499.
41. See id.
42. Micronesia is the term used to describe this archipelago in the Pacific. See, e.g.,
Bergsman, supra note 9, at 382 n.5; Justice Ramon G. Villagomeiz, supra note 11.
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On April 2, 1947, the United Nations Security Council approved the
trust agreement for the Islands. 43 The agreement provided that the Trust
would be formed under an accord between the United States, who would
act as administering authority, and the U.N. Security Council, rather than
the U.N. General Assembly.44
The Trust proved advantageous to the United States for several rea-
sons. First, because the United States was a permanent member of the
Security Council, it had a guaranteed veto over any actions that affected
the Trust Territory.45 Thus, the United States approved all measures con-
cerning the Islands and could exert, some control over the trust agreement
if it did not agree with how the Islands were managed. Also, the United
States had the authority to make fortifications on the Islands to maintain
international peace and security.46 This meant that the United States, as
administrator of the Islands, could forbid the United Nations from over-
seeing any part of the Islands by designating the Islands closed for secur-
ity purposes.47
The United States' administration of the trust territory did nothing to
speed the Islands' political and economic progress.48 The Trust imposed
certain duties on the United States, which included encouraging the in-
habitants to establish political institutions, to participate in government,
and to strive towards self-government or independence. 4 The United
States exercised absolute authority over the territory50 but did little to
foster economic growth in the Islands.5 In the 1960s, Micronesians be-
43. See LEiBowrrz, supra note 3, at 488; see also Hinck, supra note 37, at 920-21 (pro-
viding a brief description of the Trust's establishment).
44. See LE]iowYiz, supra note 3, at 488; Hinck, supra note 37, at 921.
45. See Hinck, supra note 37, at 921 (commenting on the advantageous position of the
United States as the islands' administrator).
46. See id. at 920.
47. See Leibowitz, supra note 39.
48. See LEIBowrrz, supra note 3, at 496 (claiming the United Nations visiting mission
to Micronesia in 1961 criticized the United States administration of the islands because of
the "inadequate economic development, poor educational programs, lack of health care,
poor transportation, and failure to adequately compensate for land taken for military pur-
poses"); Hinck, supra note 37, at 921.
49. See, e.g., LIEnowrrz, supra note 3, at 488 (describing the United State's role as
administrator of the Trust). Cf. Alex Tallchief Skibine, Reconciling Federal and State
Power Inside Indian Reservations with the Right Of Tribal Self-Governmnent and the Process
of Self-Determination, 1995 UTAHi L. REV. 1105, 1114-16 (1995) (summarizing the history
of the Trust Territory and analogizing it to the International Trust of Indian Nations).
50. See McHENRY, supra note 23, at 7; LEaiowrrz, supra note 3, at 489.
51. See McHENRY, supra note 23, at 7.
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gan to entertain prospects for self-determination. 2 This eventually led to
the formation of the Congress of Micronesia. 3
The Congress of Micronesia petitioned the United States to help pro-
mote self-determination in Micronesia.' Although it is unclear what
prompted the territories to begin negotiations for self-determination, it
may have been because they were increasingly dissatisfied with United
States' administration of the Islands.5" The Micronesian Legislature im-
plemented its own commission, known as the Micronesian Political Status
Commission, to undertake negotiations with the United States.'
The Commission set out four important principles to guide the negotia-
tions.57 First, sovereignty must lie with the Micronesian people and their
government. 58 Second, Micronesians should possess the right to self-de-
termination and be able to select either independence or self-govern-
ment.59 Third, the Micronesians should adopt their own constitution and
retain the option to change or amend it at all times.6" Finally, "free asso-
ciation" should be in the form of a revocable compact that may be termi-
nated by either party.6
In September of 1969, negotiations between the United States and the
Micronesians commenced, but substantial disagreements slowed the pro-
52. See LEIBOWITZ, supra note 3, at 500; MI-IENRY, supra note 23. at 7; 1 linck. supra
note 37, at 921.
53. See LEIBOWITZ, supra note 3, at 500; McHFeRY, supra note 23, at 7; see also
Hinck, supra note 37, at 921 (intimating that the slow economic progress may have per-
suaded the Micronesians to seek steps toward self-determination).
54. See, eg., Bergsman, supra note 9, at 397 (citing to Department of Interior Order
No. 2882, Sept, 28, 1964) (stating that the United States set up the Congress of Micronesia
to afford the trust territory with some amount of local government); Hinck, supra note 37,
at 921.
55. See LEIBoWrz, supra note 3, at 500 (explaining that the limitations on the Con-
gress of Micronesia's legislative role upset the Micronesian leaders).
56. See McHENRY, supra note 23, at 89.
57. See Hinck, supra note 37, at 922 (analyzing the goals of the Micronesians during
the negotiations for self-determination).
58. See, e.g., D. Michael Green, Termnation of the U.S. Pacific Islands Trusteeship. 9
TEXAS INT'L L.J. 175, 177 (1974); Hinck, supra note 37, at 922 (citing to Armstrong. The
Emergence of the Micronesians Ito the International Connunity: A Study of the Creation
of a New International Entity, 5 BROOKLYN J. ri'li. L 207, 215 n.27 (1979)).
59. See, e.g., Green, supra note 58; Hinck, supra note 37, at 922 (citing to Armstrong,
Tile Emergence of the Micronesians Into tile International Conunnnity: A Study of the Crea-
tion of a New International Entity, 5 BROOKLYN J. lwMrt L 207, 215 n.27 (1979)).
60. See, e.g., Green, supra note 58; Hinck, supra note 37, at 922 (citing to Armstrong,
Tile Emergence of the Micronesians Into the International Community: A Study of the Crea-
tion of a New International Entity, 5 BROOKLYN J. lrrt L 207, 215 n.27 (1979)).
61. See, e.g., Green, supra note 58; Hinck, supra note 37, at 922 (citing to Armstrong,
The Emergence of the Micronesians Into the International Comnmnunity: A Study of the Crea-
tion of a New International Entity, 5 BROOKLYN J. lbrr't. L 207. 215 n.27 (1979)).
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cess.6" The Micronesians desired to retain complete control of their land,
with United States military use of land being possible only after govern-
ment-to-government negotiations.6 3 In addition, the United States' posi-
tion included the retention of the power of eminent domain over
Micronesian land.64 Micronesia's desire to retain autonomy over their
land made the United States position clearly untenable.6
In the 1970s, the Northern Mariana Islands broke away from these ne-
gotiations and formed the Marianas Political Status Commission (MPSC)
to forge a closer relationship between the U.S. and the Islanders.66 The
Northern Mariana Islands' motives for breaking away from the Commis-
sion remain unclear. Perhaps they broke away from the Congress of Mi-
cronesia because the Islands in Micronesia never had any national or
territorial integrity.67 In addition, the Micronesians are ethnically and
linguistically diverse.68 Although the Islands are geographically close,
each district or entity (e.g., Truk, the Northern Marianas, and Palau)
speaks a different language and has its own unique culture.69 Another
possible motive for breaking away from the MPSC was the Islands' con-
cern that the more populated Islands of the MPSC would financially bur-
den it.7" The Northern Mariana Islands would be required to pay a
disproportionate share of taxes that would benefit the more populated
districts of Micronesia.71
62. See LEIBoWrrz, supra note 3, at 642; Green, supra note 58, at 179-80 (stating that
negotiations between the United States and the Congress of Micronesia stalled).
63. See Leibowitz, supra note 3, at 642; Hinck, supra note 37, at 922 (explaining the
Islands' desire for more control over its government).
64. See LEIBOWITZ, supra note 3, at 642; Hinck, supra note 37, at 922.
65. See LEIoWITz, supra note 3, at 642; Hinck, supra note 37, at 922.
66. See United States ex reL v. De Leon Guerrero, No. 92-00001, 1992 WL 321010 at
*27 (D.N.Mar.1., July 24, 1992), affd, 4 F.3d 749 (9th Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Guerrero 11;
Marianas Political Status Negotiations, Opening Round, supra note 1; LIBoWrrZ, supra
note 3, at 501; King, supra note 2, at 483-84.
67. See LEIBoWrrz, supra note 3, at 503; see also Leon R. Erstad, Comment, Interna-
tional Law and Dependent Territories: The Case of Micronesia, 50 "I'8HMPL L.Q. 58, 60
(1976) (claiming the United States, in its role as administering authority of tle islands,
should put the interest of the territories first by promoting self-government).
68. See LEIBOWITZ, supra note 3, at 503. The Islands have a distinct origin of the
various island natives. See id. at 484. For example, the Marshall Island natives migrated
from Southeast Asia while the Northern Mariana Islanders may have migrated from Mela-
nesia. See Id.
69. See id. (stating that the natives of the Northern Mariana Islands are not identical
to the Marshallese nor are the Marshall natives identical to the inhabitants of the island of
Yap or Ponape).
70. See id. at 483 (noting that the island of Truk, whose population accounts for 28%
of Micronesians, is the most populated of the territories).
71. See id. at 504.
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Pre-covenant negotiations between the United States and the Northern
Mariana Islands continued until 1978.72 The people of the Northern Ma-
riana Islands conducted a plebiscite73 which indicated that an overwhelm-
ing majority desired to become a part of the United States.74 This
plebiscite, however, was strongly criticized by the Congress of Micronesia
and the United Nations.75 The Congress of Micronesia was outraged at
the negotiations between the United States and the Northern Mariana
Islands, and did not endorse the separate talks.7" The United Nations
accused the United States of encouraging a "separatist movement" in the
Northern Marianas. 77 Furthermore, they refused to endorse the Cove-
nant because it was an improper method to terminate the trusteeship and
it was overly advantageous to the United States.78
Other critics of the plebiscite argued that it was arranged in a manipu-
lative manner by permitting only a "yes" or "no" answer to the Cove-
72. See E-mail from Ramon G. Villagomez, Former Associate Supreme Court Justice,
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, to Marie Rios Martinez, Staff Writer,
The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Minority Issues (Jan. 15, 2000) (on file with au-
thor) (stating that Covenant negotiations ended in 1974; the plebiscite was held in 1975;
and, the Northern Mariana Islands government was installed in January. 1978); See, e.g..
Robert Torres, Comment, Ferreira v. Borja: Land Transactions in the Northern Marianas,
29 NEW ENG. L. REV. 209, 210-13 (1994).
73. See BLACK's LAW DicrIONARY 1153 (6th ed. 1990) (defining plebiscite as people
voting "to express their choice for or against a proposed law, enactment, submitted to
them, and which, if adopted, will work a change in the constitution, or which is beyond the
powers of the regular legislative body); see also Naomi Hirayasu, The Process of Self.Deter-
inination and Micronesia's Future Political Status Under hIternational Law, 9 U. HAw. L
REV. 487, 505 (1987) (describing the Northern Mariana plebiscite).
74. See Guerrero 1, 1992 WL 321010, at *6 (asserting that 78% of registered voters,
voted in favor of the Covenant); see also Lciiowrrz, supra note 3, at 505 (describing the
Northern Mariana Islands plebiscite process and its results).
75. See LEmoWrrz, supra note 3, at 496 (expressing the United Nations disappoint-
ment of United States actions to establish a political relationship with the Northern Mari-
ana Islands).
76. See id. at 501-02. The separate negotiations between the United States and the
Northern Mariana Islands infuriated members of the Congress of Micronesia who criti-
cized the move by issuing a "harshly worded resolution" condemning the United States'
actions. See id. In that resolution, the Congress of Micronesia stated that the United
States disregarded the recommendations of the United Nations Trusteeship Council during
its 1973 Visiting Mission. See id. The United States separate administration of any part of
Micronesia without a referendum violated its obligation as administering authority. See id.
77. See id. at 496. See generally Larry Wentworth, The International Status arid Per-
sonalty of Micronesian Political Entities, 16 ILSA J. I'-r"tL L 1 (analyzing the political
evolution of the Trust Territory); Ruth Gordon, Saving Failed States: Sometimes a Ne-
ocolonialist Notion, 12 Am. U. J. I r'L L. & Pot.'Y 903, 923 (1997).
78. See Bergsman, supra note 9, at 385. The United Nations were actually excluded
from partaking in the Covenant negotiations, in direct contradiction to the requirements if
the United Nations Charter. See id. at 396-397.
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nant.79 These critics maintained that the plebiscite did not permit free
expression for the people of the Northern Mariana Islands because the
United States offered continued, large-scale aid to the Islands in ex-
change for a "yes" vote." In addition, the "no" vote would have implied
endorsement of trust status.8'
The stern criticisms of both the United Nations and the Micronesian
Congress failed to thwart efforts towards establishing a Covenant be-
tween the United States and the Northern Mariana Islands. The North-
ern Mariana Islands ultimately formed a Covenant with the United States
in January of 1975.82
III. THE COVENANT'S FUNDAMENTAL PROVISIONS
A. Sovereignty and The Right To Local Self-Government
Because United States sovereignty over the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) arises solely from the Covenant,83 it is
crucial to examine the Covenant's provisions. The Covenant is divided
into ten main articles that define the political relationship between the
CNMI and the United States.' Since its enactment, three fundamental
79. See id. at 404 n.97 (criticizing the plebiscite for not providing alternatives to the
Islanders).
80. See id. at 405 n.101. Bergsman advances that Northern Mariana Islands' depen-
dency on United States was not accidental. See id. A secret study done by the Kennedy
administration recommended the United States could gain control of Micronesia if con-
gressional grants were provided to the people. See id. The study also encouraged the
United States to educate the people in American ways and then conduct a plebiscite while
Micronesia's appreciation of United States' generosity was high. See id.
81. Id. at 403. The Islands were made to elect between a new status that presented
rights to citizenship or a trusteeship with no rights to citizenship. See id.
82. See, e.g., Proclamation No. 4534, 42 Fed. Reg. 56593 (Oct. 24, 1977), reprinted h
48 U.S.C.A. § 1801 (West Supp. 2000).
83. See Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, 48
U.S.C.A. § 1801, art. I, § 102 (West Supp. 2000); Justice Ramon G. Villagomez, Address at
the 1994 Conference on U.S. Federal-Insular Areas Relation (May 26, 1994).
84. See id. § 1801 art. I-X. Article I establishes the political relationship between the
Islands and the United States. See i. Article I also provides the Islands shall have a right
to local self-government. See id. Article II requires the Islands to establish a democratic
form of government and models the United States Constitution. See id. Article III confers
United States citizenship on the people of the Northern Mariana Islands. See id. Article
IV discusses the judicial system of the Northern Mariana Islands and also describes the
judicial relationship between the United States and the Northern Marianas. See id. Article
V stipulates that only certain provisions of the United States Constitution will alpply to te
Northern Marianas. See id. Article V1 provides that the Northern Mariana Islands will
have local control over its tax law. See id. Article VII sets out a timeline for the type and
amount of financial assistance the Northern Mariana Islands will receive from the United
States. See id. Article VIII provides that in order to protect the indigenous population
against exploitation, the Northern Mariana Islands may restrict the alienation of certain
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provisions under Article I continue to cause on-going debate: section 101,
section 103, and section 105.85 Section 101 of the Covenant states "the
Northern Mariana Islands will become a self-governing common-
wealth... in political union with and under the sovereignty of the United
States. '86 Compounding what has proven to be a contentious position,
section 103 additionally provides that the Islands have the right of local
self-government in accordance with their own laws.87
Due to this facially incongruent position, the CNMI and the United
States disagree as to the amount of sovereignty signed over to the United
States by the Islands at the time they entered into the covenant. The
fact that the Islands would be under the sovereignty of the United States
is clear if one reads only section 101.89 It is also equally clear that section
103 specifically provides the people of the CNMI the right of local self-
government in accordance with a Constitution of their own adoption. 0
However, because the Covenant is silent as to whether or not the United
States retains full or limited sovereignty over the CNMI, the degree of
sovereignty depends on whether or not the sovereignty provision of sec-
tion 101 is read together with the right to self-government provision of
section 103.91
The extent of United States sovereignty to enact legislation over the
CNMI has also caused confusion in the courts.92 In U.S. ex rel. Richards
v. De Leon Guerrero,9 3 the district court of the CNMI held that the
United States could impose legislation over the Islands via the Territory
interests in real property to those of Northern Mariana Islands descent. See id. In addi-
tion, the Northern Mariana Islands agreed to lease property to the United States for mili-
tary purposes at $1.00 per acre. See id. Article IX provides a representative for the
Northern Mariana Islands to the United States. See id. Article IX also stipulates that
Northern Mariana Islands and the United States will consult on a regular basis on all mat-
ters affecting their political relationship. See id. Article X addresses the approval, effec-
tive dates, definition of the Covenant, and provides that upon the President's issuance of
the proclamation announcing the termination of the trusteeship agreement, the Northern
Mariana Islands will become a Commonwealth. See id.
85. See id. § 1801, art. I § 101-105.
86. Id. § 1801, art. I § 101 (emphasis added).
87. See id. § 1801, art. I § 103.
88. See Justice Ramon G. Villagomez, supra note 11.
89. See Hearing on H.J. Res. 549, H.J. Res. 550, and HJ. Res. 547, supra note 7.
90. See Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, 48
U.S.C.A. § 1801, art. I, § 103 (Vest Supp. 2000).
91. United States ex rel. Richards v. De Leon Guerrero, 4 F.3d 749, 753-55 (9th Cir.
1993)[hereinafter Guerrero I]. See also Herald, supra note 29, at 134-37
92. See, &g., Guerrero 11, 4 F.3d at 755; Sablan v. Inos, 3 N.M.I. 418. No. 91-734, 91-
018, 1993 WL 307656 (N. Mar. 1) (Jan. 21, 1993).
93. See Guerrero 1. 1992 WL 321010
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Clause of the United States Constitution.94 On appeal, however, the
Ninth Circuit declared that the Territorial Clause was not, in fact, the
source of Congress' legislative power over the CNMI.95
In Guerrero, the Department of Interior subpoenaed tax records of the
CNMI to determine whether the Islands established a tax system to assess
and collect the income tax imposed.96 The district court held that the
CNMI was not a sovereign state. 97 In addition, the court stated that the
CNMI could not have equal sovereignty with the United States nor did
they exist under dual sovereignty with the United States.98 The court
noted that the Islands do not possess equal sovereignty with the United
States because it surrendered sovereignty as stipulated under section 101
of the Covenant.99 A sovereign state is one that has the power of self-
government, the court noted, and is independent from all other states.100
The rationale employed by the district court suggested that the CNMI did
not contemplate complete sovereignty because rather than choosing to be
in free association 1 with the United States, the Islands elected to be in a
"political union with [and under the] sovereignty of the United States."' 10 2
Furthermore, the court asserted that if the CNMI had any sovereignty,
this sovereignty was "clipped" rather than complete.10 3 The court found
that the Islands relinquished primary sovereignty to the United States,
94. See id., at *37 (finding that the territorial clause provides the constitutional basis
for Congress' legislative authority in the Commonwealth)
95. See Guerrero II, 4 F.3d at 754. The Guerrero 11 Court stated that the Covenant is
sole measure of the limits of Congress' legislative powers. See id. The territorial clause
cannot apply to the Northern Mariana Islands because 501 of the Covenant lists the parts
of the United States Constitution that extend to the Islands and the territorial clause is not
one of them. See King, supra note 2, at 180. To apply the territorial clause would circum-
vent the Covenant's provisions and the fact the status of the Islands was negotiated and not
the product of conquest. See id.
96. See Guerrero 1, 1992 WL 321010, at *1-2.
97. See id. at *34.
98. See id. at *22; see also BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1396 (6th ed. 1990) (defining
sovereignty as "the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power by which any indepen-
dent state is governed").
99. See Guerrero 1, 1992 WL 321010, at *35.
100. See id. at *34.
101. See LEIBowITz, supra note 3, at 641-42. Leibowitz defines "free association" as a
status in which a state chooses to be independent and have the option to associate freely
with other states. See id. Thus, a freely associated state has the following elements: the
unilateral ability to end the relationship with another state; the lack of U.S. citizenship for
the residents; the capacity to engage in world affairs as an international sovereign with
limited restraint; and finally, the capacity to have their own monetary system. See id. at 44.
102. See Guerrero 1, 1992 WL 321010, at *35.
103. See Guerrero 1, 1992 WL 321010, at *34-35. The Court inferred the notion of
"clipped sovereignty" to mean incomplete sovereignty. See id. In contrast, full sovereignty
means that states have "the entire power of self-government" independent from all the
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therefore they had a sovereignty comparable but less than the states.1 4
Furthermore, the court seemed to imply that this clipped sovereignty lim-
ited the Islands' right to local self-government. 05
In his speech at the 1994 Conference on U.S. Federal Insular Areas
Relations, former Supreme Court Associate Justice of the CNMI, Ramon
G. Villagomez, addressed the Islands' position on the issue of United
States sovereignty. According to Mr. Villagomez, the CNMI maintains
that limited sovereignty was transferred to the United States in the areas
of foreign affairs and defense.'0 6 Moreover, the CNMI asserts that the
Islands retained any sovereignty not expressly transferred in the
Covenant.10
7
Indeed, the Covenant's provisions state that the United States has sov-
ereignty over the Islands but that this sovereignty is limited to the extent
set out in section 103.1"8 This section provides that the CNMI would be
self-governing in their internal affairs.'0 9 If the sovereignty provision
takes precedence over the right to local self-government, other funda-
mental provisions of the Covenant are rendered meaningless, as it would
give the United States overreaching authority over the Islands. By exer-
cising complete sovereignty over the Islands without allowing the CNMI
a voting member in Congress, the United States is in effect promoting
congressional colonialism over the Northern Mariana Islands.
B. The Mutual Consent Provision
The authority of the United States to enact legislation over the Islands
continues to be a matter of disagreement. "o Both the courts and Con-
gress have addressed whether Section 105, also known as the mutual con-
sent provision, limits the United States' power to enact legislation
affecting the Islands."1'
other states upon its territory and citizens and that "no foreign power can have control
over the state except by convention." Id.
104. See id. at *35.
105. See id. at *34.
106. See Justice Ramon G. Villagomez, supra note 1I.
107. See id.
108. See Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, 48
U.S.C.A. § 1801, art. I, § 103 (West Supp. 2000).
109. See id.
110. See, e.g., Guerrero II, 4 F.3d at 755; Hillblom v. United States, 896 F.2d 426, 429-
30 (9th Cir. 1990); A&E Pac. Constr. Co. v. Saipan Stevedore Co., 888 F.2d 68, 70-71 (9th
Cir. 1990).
111. See Justice Ramon G. Villagomez, supra note 11. Justice Villagomez points out
that Congress adopts the opinion that it can enact laws incompatible with Section 105,
while the Islands believe that this section explicitly restricts the authority of Congress to
pass legislation. See id.
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The mutual consent principle under section 105 of the Covenant is sim-
ple: the fundamental provisions of the Covenant may not be modified
without the approval of both the United States and the CNMI. t2 How-
ever, section 105 of the Covenant also provides that the United States
may enact legislation affecting the Islands' right to local self-government
with two stipulations.113 First, the United States cannot enact legislation
over the Islands unless the legislation also applies to the several States." 1
4
Second, the United States will limit its legislative authority over the Is-
lands to ensure that the Covenant's fundamental provisions are not modi-
fied without the consent of both the United States and the Islands." 5
However, to effectuate the true meaning of the Covenant, the mutual
consent provision and the right to local self-government must be read
together. By reading these two provisions together, the United States'
sovereignty over the Islands remains limited by the CNMI's right to local
self-government.
The basis for the Covenant's mutual consent provision lies in the his-
tory of the Islands' acquisition by the United States. The Islands did not
become a Commonwealth of the United States under a treaty, as did the
Commonwealths of Puerto Rico and Guam.1 16 Instead, the Islands' sta-
tus as a "Commonwealth" was reached through negotiations with the
United States. 1 7 Pursuant to these negotiations, Congress agreed not to
alter the Covenant's fundamental purpose unilaterally. 118 The Islands de-
cided that the commonwealth relationship provided assurances of local
112. See Covenant to Establish Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, 48
U.S.C.A. § 1801, art. I, § 105 (West Supp. 2000); Guerrero 11, 4 F.3d at 755; see also Hear-
ing on H.J. Res. 549, H.J. Res. 550, and H.J. Res. 547, supra note 7 (affirming that the
mutual consent provision protects the Islands from alteration to their right to self-govern-
ment, and their political relationship with the United States); Herald, supra note 29, at 136-
37.
113. See Covenant to Establish Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, 48
U.S.C.A. § 1801, art. I, § 105 (West Supp. 2000); Hearing on H.J. Res. 549, H.J. Res. 550,
and H.1. Res. 547, supra note 7.
114. See, e.g., Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Is-
lands, 48 U.S.C.A § 1801, art. I, § 105 (West Supp. 2000); Guerrero 11, 4 F.3d at 753; Hear-
ing on H.J. Res. 549, H.J. Res. 550, and H.J. Res. 547, supra note 7.
115. See Covenant to Establish Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, 48
U.S.C.A. § 1801, art. I § 105 (West Supp. 2000); see also Jennifer Davis, Comment, Beneath
the American Flag: United States Law and International Principles Governing the Covenant
Between the United States and Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, t3 "rmANS.
NAT'T LAW 135, 143 (2000).
116. See Hearing on H.]. Res. 549, H.J. Res. 550, and ILJ. Res. 547, supra note 7 (stat-
ing that the term 'commonwealth' for the Islands does not convey the equivalent status
held by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico).
117. See id. See also Davis, supra note 115, at 142.
118. To Hearing on HLJ. Res. 549, ILJ. Res. 550, and H.J. Res. 547, supra note 7; Da-
vis, supra note 115, at 143.
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self-government and a permanent political union with the United
States.119 Consequently, the mutual consent provision specifically names
the sections of the United States constitution that apply to the Islands;
therefore, any other laws would have to be mutually agreed to by both
parties. 120
1. Judicial Interpretation
Several cases have addressed the United States authority to enact and
impose legislation over the CNMI.12 1 U.S. ex rel. Richards v. De Leon
Guerrero and Sablan v. lnosm 22 illustrate the difficulty in defining the
Covenant's boundaries between the Islands' right to local self-govern-
ment and the United States' authority to impose federal regulations.'
In Sablan v. Inos, two local taxpayers sought an injunction to prevent
the Islands' government from disclosing their taxpayer information to the
United States Interior Department's Inspector General.'24 The CNMI's
Supreme Court issued a temporary injunction prohibiting the release of
tax information to anyone not authorized under the Northern Mariana
Islands' statute.1 2 5 Eventually, the Islands' highest court held that the
audit on local taxpayer records would intrude upon the taxpayers' right to
privacy under the CNMI's Constitution and under the Islands' tax confi-
dentiality provision. 26 The CNMI's Supreme Court in Sablan further
held that the Inspector General's audit would be inconsistent with the
Islands' right to local self-government.1 27 The Court held that the statute
authorizing the Inspector General to audit local tax records had no "force
and effect" in the Islands.128
As noted, the issue in Guerrero concerned the power of the Inspector
General of the United States Department of the Interior to request cop-
ies of the Islands' local tax records.' 29 The district court in Guerrero en-
forced an administrative subpoena ordering the local government to
119. See Hearing on H.J. Res. 549, H.J. Res. 550, and IIJ. Res. 547, supra note 7.
120. See King, supra note 2, at 497.
121. See, e.g., Guerrero II, 4 F.3d at 428-29 (discussing whether citizens of Northern
Mariana Islands have standing to sue to prevent enactment or enforcement of United
States laws contradictory to the Covenant); A&E Pac. Constr. Co. 888 F.2d at 70-71 (dis-
cussing whether the Shipping Act of 1984 applies to the Islands).
122. See Sablan, 1993 WL 307656 at *3-4.
123. See id. See also Guerrero 11, 4 F.3d at 753-55.
124. See Sablan, 1993 WL 307656, at *1-2.
125. See id. at *6.
126. See id. at *5-6. Accord Guerrero 1I, 4 F.3d at 752.
127. See Sablan, 1993 WL 3-7656 at *6.
128. See id. Accord Guerrero I, 4 F.3d at 752.
129. See Guerrero II, 4 F.3d at 752.
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release tax records in order to conduct an audit. 130 The government of
the CNMI, relying on the Islands' Supreme Court decision in Sablan v.
Inos, refused to grant the Inspector General the records necessary to con-
duct the audit.1 31 The government was concerned that the audit violated
the Islands' right to local self-government. 132
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit ignored the ruling of the Islands' highest
court. The Ninth Circuit balanced the federal interest served by the legis-
lation against the degree of intrusion into the internal affairs of the
CNMI. 133 The court held that the statute authorizing the Inspector Gen-
eral's right to audit local tax records did not violate the Islands' right to
local self-government.1 34 The court based this holding on the United
States' substantial interest in monitoring the Islands' collection of
taxes. 1
35
In essence, the Ninth Circuit's holding gives the United States broad
power to examine all tax records for the CNMI. Yet, less restrictive
means were available to the United States that would have enabled them
to monitor the federal funds. Instead, however, the Ninth Circuit upheld
this broad intrusion into the affairs of the people of the CNMI.
2. Effects of Judicial Interpretation
The holding in Guerrero violates the Islands' right to local self-govern-
ment and renders the Covenant's mutual consent provision meaningless.
If Congress can alter the Covenant's provisions because of United States
aid to the CNMI, then it stands to reason that the court and Congress can
use virtually any justification to alter the Covenant's provisions. The
Ninth Circuit stipulated that the federal interest (i.e., federal control of
financial assistance to the Islands) must be protected. 136 However, it ne-
glected to address the rights of the citizens of the CNMI. It is for this
reason that the limits of United States sovereignty, and conversely, the
Islands' right to local self-government, must be clarified. The United
States does not hold unfettered discretion over the Islands. By exercising
such discretion, the United States is effectively practicing congressional
colonialism.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 755.
134. See id. (finding that it was necessary to balance the federal interest against the
degree of intrusion).
135. Id.
136. See id. (finding that the United States had a significant concern in checking that
the federal funds were being used properly in the Islands).
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As it is currently interpreted, the mutual consent provision is a one-
sided agreement through which the Islands have effectively "self-deter-
mined" their way into bondage.'37 The mutual consent provision under
section 105 of the Covenant has, in essence, locked the CNMI into the
American political system with only one way to get out: obtaining the
approval of the United States.'38 This requirement violates the Cove-
nant's mutual consent provision under section 105 because it is no longer
mutual but unilateral.
IV. CONGRESSIONAL COLONIALISM DISGUISED AS DEMOCRACY
The United States' relationship with other indigenous peoples has been
historically antagonistic. This is due to the mistaken presumption that
indigenous peoples will benefit from the imposition of American princi-
ples.139 For example, when the United States invaded Puerto Rico, Gen-
eral Miles, who organized the invasion, declared, "this is not a war of
devastation, but one to give to all within the control of its military and
naval forces the advantages and blessings of enlightened civilization."' 40
The same sentiment was conveyed when the Native Americans were dis-
placed from their land and the Native Hawai'ians were colonized by the
United States.
A. Native Americans
In the name of territorial expansion, the United States government did
everything in their power to secure the land of the Native Americans.'
4
'
Government negotiators coerced Native American leaders to sign a num-
ber of treaties that not only diminished their land but also undermined
137. See Bergsman, supra note 9, at 407 (criticizing the mutual consent language of
the Covenant because there is no way for Islands to opt out unilaterally).
138. See id.
139. See Jos6 Trfas Monge, Article, Plenary Pover atnd the Principle of Liberty: An
Alternative View of the Political Condition of Puerto Rico, 68A Rtev. JuR,. U.P.R. 1, 1-6
(1999) (pointing out the assumption that United States' administration of others is a privi-
lege to those governed).
140. See Arron Guevara, Puerto Rico: Manifestations of Colonialisn, 26 REv. JuR.
U.P.R. 275, 283 (1992). There seems to be an attitude that Puerto Rico has no right to self-
government. See id. In criticizing Puerto Rico's Constitution. Senator Mahoney who is the
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs stated: "t think it may
be stated as fundamental that the Constitution of the United States gives the Congress
complete control and nothing in the Puerto Rican constitution could affect or amend or
alter that right. That constitution is before us and I find nothing in it which goes beyond
the scope of local self-government which we by law expressly authorized." Id. at 283.
141. See ALVIN M. JOSEPHY, JR., 500 NATION: AN ILLUISTRATED HISTORY Of, NoRui
AMERICAN INDIANS 277 (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 1994).
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their sovereignty.14' During the westward expansion of the United States
and the subsequent displacement of Native Americans, Thomas Jefferson
Morgan, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, stated:
The Indians must conform to 'the white man's ways,' peaceably if
they will, forcibly if they must. They must.., conform their mode of
living substantially to our civilization. This civilization may not be
the best possible, but it is the best the Indians can get. They can not
escape it, and must either conform to it or be crushed by it.... 113
Years later, the Indian Self-Determination Act144 served to perpetuate
the effects of congressional colonialism. The Act purported to give Na-
tive Americans the inherent right to self-determination.145 Congress in-
terpreted the Act, however, to provide that Native Americans could exert
limited participation in their affairs, but could not exert full control. 46
The Act obscurely promised both self-determination and limited partici-
pation, an ambiguity that was also created in the Covenant with the
Northern Mariana Islands.1
4 7
B. Native Hawai'ians
Afraid that another nation would take control of the Hawai'ian islands
due to their strategic location, the United States forced King Kalakaua to
sign the Bayonet Constitution, which reduced the King's power to that of
a ceremonial leader and created a cabinet made up of American and Brit-
142. See id.
143. See id. at 431-32. The Native American culture changed when they were taught
to abandon their way of life and adopt American ways. See id. In 1492, Columbus "discov-
ered" what he called "los indios" and opened the gateway to the "discovery" of the Native
Americans and the disenfranchisement of their societies. See id. at 115. It was not until
the European expansionism that the Native Americans encountered the English who
sought settlements for profit. See id. During their displacement, Native Americans, be-
came strangers in their own land. See id. Ile Native Americans' way of life, such as hunt-
ing and fishing, perished as they became assimilated. See id. Children were sent to
boarding schools to learn the arts and the proper ways of the whites. See id, at 432.
144. See Indian Self Determination Act, 25 U.S.C.A. § 450 (West Supp. 2000) (author-
izing Indian self-determination through maximum participation in education and other fed-
eral programs).
145. See id. See also Markus B. Heyder, Note, The International Law Cotnmnission's
Draft Articles on State Responsibility: Draft Article 19 and Native American Self-Deterinina-
tion, 32 COLUM. J. "RANSNAT'L L. 155, 174-75 (1994).
146. See Heyder, supra note 145. Although the Act establishes a promise to establish
meaningful Indian self-determination policy, it provides them with limited forms of self-
determination and self-government. See id.
147. See, e.g., Indian Self Determination Act, 25 U.S.C.A. § 450 (West Supp. 2000);
Covenant to Establish Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, 48 U.S.C.A.
§ 1801, art. I § 105 (West Supp. 2000).
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ish businessmen. 48 After the King's death, the United States plotted the
overthrow of Queen Lili'uokalani, who would not yield to American in-
terest. 149 Under a provisional government, the United States secured a
resolution that successfully furthered American interest at the expense of
the Native Hawai'ians.1
5 0
As with Hawaii, the strategic location of the Northern Mariana Islands
prompted United States negotiations to form a political union with
Northern Mariana Islands. As administrator of the Islands under the
Trust Territory, the United States violated its role as trustee of the Is-
lands. The United States, in looking out for its own self-interest, initially
encouraged the Islands to exercise their right of self-determination, and
then conditioned that right by requiring the Islands to cede their sover-
eignty to the United States.
Under the status of trustee, the United States would have been instru-
mental in encouraging the Islands to establish a democratic form of gov-
ernment.151 Even though an overwhelming majority of the Islands'
population voted to become part of the American political family, critics
148. See Lisa Cami Oshiro, Comment, Recognizing Na Kanaka Maoli's Right to Self-
Determination, 25 N.M.L. REv. 65, 69 (1995). Oshiro notes that Senator Aaron Sargent of
California viewed the treaty as a means to further American interests and encouraged
Americans to go and make Hawaii an American colony. See id. American reformers
handed King Kalakaua what is now known as the Bayonet Constitution, and gave him 24
hours to sign it. See id. To avoid a plot to assassinate him, King Kalakaua reluctantly
signed the Constitution. Id. at 70.
149. See id. at 72. Under protest, Queen Lili'uokalani "abdicated her throne" to pro-
tect the Native Hawai'ans. See id. "T7he provisional government knew that the Queen's
weakness was the welfare and safety of her people. See id. Therefore, the provisional
government threatened the people if Queen Lili'uokalini did not abdicate her throne. See
id. at 73. The provisional government consisted of American and British businessmen who
sought to annex Hawaii due to concern for Hawaii's relationship with other foreign coun-
tries and the desire to protect U.S. economic and military interests. After Queen
Lili'uokalani was dethroned she wrote: "lI]t had not entered into our hearts to believe that
these friends and allies from the United States ... would ever go so far as to absolutely
overthrow our form of government [and] seize our nation by the throat..." Id. at 72.
Queen Lili'uokalani, however, refused to give up and traveled to Washington to plead with
the President to give her back her throne. See id. at 73. However, tile Queen's request
went unheeded. See id. at 69. See also laryn Ranae Tomasa, lo'olahui" The Rebirth of a
Nation, 5 AsIAN L.J. 247, 252-54 (1998) (describing the overthrowing of Queen
Lili'uokalani's throne).
150. See Oshiro, supra note 148, at 74. After King Kalakaua's death, the Americans,
with the support of United States Marines, set up a provisional government. See id. at 71.
151. See Camacho-Romisher, supra note 2 (indicating that the United States pledged
to further the self-sufficiency of the inhabitants by encouraging self-government); King,
supra note 2, at 480 (reiterating that the United States had the duty to further the advance-
ment of the inhabitant toward self-determination or independence). See generally, lL.mo.
wiv-z, supra note 3, at 496 (describing the United Nations observations of conditions in
Micronesia in 1961, while under the United States administration).
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point out that there should have been a third choice on the ballot.'52 One
such critic points out that the ballot should have at least included the
right to "free-association" as a third option.'53
Throughout Covenant negotiations, the Marianas Political Status Com-
mission reiterated their desire to become a part of the United States, not
only to ensure their freedom to "live as free men,"' 5 4 but also to provide
the Islands the freedom to determine their own destiny.'55 The Islands
believed the United States would not take advantage of them:
We are not afraid of the possible abuse under such an arrangement
with the United States ... [w]e are satisfied that the United States
Constitution offers us enough latitude to be able to protect our peo-
ple . . . [n]either do we abrogate our rights to negotiate with the
United States toward the most favorable resolution of our own posi-
tion on such specific issues as they may arise.' 56
However, the ideal political union the Islands envisioned was not actu-
alized by the Covenant. On the contrary, although the Covenant explic-
itly acknowledged and bestowed the Islands with self-government, it also
stated that they were under the sovereignty of the United States. The
United States must not continue creating new forms of colonialism by
camouflaging unequal relationships by denominating nations as "com-
monwealths"' 57 or by giving the Islands the illusion of autonomy. In real-
ity, the sovereignty provision of the Covenant is an effort by the United
States to override any possibility of the Islands actually enjoying self-gov-
ernment. This ambiguity has allowed Congress to interpret the Covenant
as allowing the enactment of federal legislation contrary to the self-gov-
ernment provision.
152. See Bergsman, supra note 9, at 407.
153. See id. Bergsman describes free-association as the freedom to modify the status
of the territory in question. See id.
154. See Marianas Political Status Negotiations, Opening Round, supra note 1. In
their Statement of Position, the citizens of the Northern Mariana Islands stated that "[flor
the first time in four centuries, the people of the Marianas now live as free men. Political
union with the United States will ensure that we keep this freedom so long denied to us."
Id.
155. See id.
156. Id. Mr. Edward Pangelinan addressed the United Nations Trusteeship Cotncil
Hearings in May, 1972. See id.
157. See Guevara, supra note 140, at 286-87 (criticizing the United States and Puerto
Rican leaders for promoting a false sense of status by using words such as "union" or
"federation" which camouflages unequal relationships under terms which have pleasant
connotations).
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V. BENEFIT OR BURDEN: EXAMINING TIE EFFECTS OF
THE COVENANT
Today, the relationship between the United States and the Islands is at
best strained as the United States continues to exert its sovereignty. In
1997, Congress introduced Bill 1275, which sought to implement federal
wage, labor, and tax laws on the CNMI. 158 Although Bill 1275 was not
ratified as proposed, new legislation emerged from this bill, including the
Covenant Implementation Act and the Made in USA Label Defense
Act.159 This present legislation seeks both to remove the Islands' local
control of immigration law and to impose quotas and tariffs on garments
made in the Islands. 16
0
A. The Covenant Implementation Act
By introducing the Covenant Implementation Act, the United States
seeks to implement federal immigration laws on the Islands.' 6' The Act
was introduced to address alleged labor abuses in the Islands.' 62 The
abuses included reports of sweatshops and prostitution., 63 While the
158. See Position Paper, supra note 18.
159. See Northern Mariana Islands Covenant Implementation Act, S. 1052, 106th
Cong. § 1(6)(1), WL 1999 CONG US S 1052; Made in USA Label Defense Act of 1999. S.
922, 106th Cong. § 7 (1999); Made in the USA Label Defense Act of 1999, HR 1621, 106th
Cong. § 7-8 (1999); see also Bill OK'd Ertending Immigration Laws to Marianas, (o;.
DAILY AM., Oct. 21, 1999, 1999 WL 27685268.
160. Compare Northern Mariana Islands Covenant Implementation Act, S. 1052,
106th Cong. § 1(6)(1), WL 1999 CONG US S 1052 (indicating that United States Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act will be extend to the Islands), ivith Made in USA Label Defense
Act of 1999, S. 922, 106th Cong. § 7 (1999), and Made in USA Label Defense Act of 1999,
HR 1621, 106th Cong. § 7-8 (1999) (detailing that all products made in the Islands shall not
be allow into the United States free of tariffs).
161. See Northern Mariana Islands Covenant Implementation Act, S. 1052. 106th
Cong. § 1(6)(1), WL 1999 CONG US S 1052; see also Government Press Release. Daniel
Kahikana Akada, Senate Passes CNMI Reform Bill (Feb. 7, 2000), available at 2000 WL
7978379 (stating that the Northern Mariana Islands Covenant Implementation Act was
introduced 1999, passed the Senate in February 2000, and is currently awaiting further
action in the House of Representatives).
162. See Akada, supra note 161 (detailing some of the abuses in the Islands like low-
pay, tedious and long hours). See generally Editorial, The Battle of the Marianas, WAS1I.
TIMES, Aug. 23, 1999, at Al; Aaron Schvey and Denise Froning, Opinion: Will Congress
Impose Tariffs on Its Own Citizens?, KNitirr-RIDDER Triw. Bus. Na-ws, Sept. 22, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 26755333.
163. See generally Rose Cruz Cuison, Comment, The Constntction of Labor Abuse in
the Mariana Islands as Anti-American, 6 AsIAN PAc. AM. LI. 61, at 63 (2000) (quoting 143
Cong Rec E888-02 (daily ed. May 8, 1997)). Cuison states that "Iflederal lawmakers, advo-
cates, human rights groups, and labor unions have uniformly maintained that the main
cause of labor abuse in the [Northern Mariana Islands] is its exemption from federal mini-
mum wage and immigration laws." Id. Several lawsuits have erupted on behalf of all for-
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CNMI acknowledges that the accusations of labor abuses must be taken
seriously and investigated without hesitation, they also maintain that the
severity of these disputes remains open to debate.' 64 Furthermore, the
Islands claim that media and political sensationalism have presented a
one-sided account. 165
Although the Islands were given an opportunity to testify before Con-
gress concerning the Act, 1 66 the final draft of the bill reflected essentially
a one-sided agreement.' 67 If it is passed, the primary effect of the Act
will be to gradually supplant CNMI labor and immigration laws with fed-
eral legislation over a ten-year period. 16
Currently, the CNMI retains local control over immigration, labor, and
wage laws. 169 This control was specifically reserved to the Islands by the
terms of the Covenant. 7 ' Although the Covenant provided that Con-
gress could make federal immigration laws applicable to the CNMI, 171 it
mer and current garment employees on the Islands. See Shawn Behn, Lending U.S.
Nothing Retailers Settle Sweatshops Clains in Saipan, AGENCc FRANCE-PRESSE, Mar. 29,
2000, available at 2000 WL 2762667. Several large companies have settled the federal class-
action lawsuit including Calvein Klein and Tommy Hilfiger. See id.
164. See Statement of Juan N. Babuta, supra note 16. Babuta asserted that it is not
due to absence of federal law, workplace law, or commitment of the Islands' government
that these conditions have come up. See id. See, e.g., Cuison, supra note 163, at 63. 'Ille
author states that the discourse concerning abuses on the Islands does not take into ac-
count the Islands' history of colonialism, its struggle for self-government, or exercise of
self-determination. See id. It also does not account for the effect of federalization on tle
Islands' economic and political development. See id. In addition, the current discourse
concerning labor disputes does not address the federal government's poor enforcement of
federal labor and employment laws, and the effect of Westernization on the Islands' cul-
ture. See id. at 79.
165. See Editorial, supra note 162 (finding that a four year plan to target the Islands
included department employees feeding damaging information to the Democratic Con-
gressional Campaign Committee).
166. See, e.g., Statement of Juan N. Babauta, supra note 16; Position Paper, supra
note 18.
167. The Islands do not have a voting representative in Congress; therefore, their par-
ticipation in the passage of the Covenant Implementation Act was marginal at best. See
Schvey and Froning, supra note 162.
168. See Northern Mariana Islands Covenant Implementation Act, S. 1052, 106th
Cong. (2000), WL 1999 CONG US S 1052; Akada, supra note 161; Juliet Eilperin, Islands
Rehire Lobbyist to Fight Labor Bill, WASH. Posr, Sept. 3, 2000, at A06; Schvey and Fron-
ing, supra note 162.
169. Schvey and Froning, supra note 162.
170. See The Enforcement of Federal laws and the use of Federal fimnds in the Northern
Mariana Islands: Oversight Hearing Before House Contn. On Resources, 106th Cong.
(1999) (Testimony of Lynn A. Knight, Vice President, Saipan Chamber of Commerce);
Akada, supra note 161.
171. See Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, 48
U.S.C.A. § 1801 art. V, § 503(a) (West 2000).
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also specifically furnished the Islands with the right of local self-govern-
ment and control of internal affairs. 172
The CNMI maintains that this arbitrary imposition of United States
policy will have a disastrous effect on the Islands.'" Specifically, the
CNMI contends that the imposition of this Act will have adverse conse-
quences on its fledgling economy.'74 The original decision to entrust the
Islands with local control of immigration was the result of the Islands'
unique economic situation.'75 The Islands' major businesses, such as ho-
tels and service industries, are dependent on foreign labor.' 76 Thus, the
imposition of federal immigration laws will potentially leave the CNMI's
labor market without enough manpower to fill entry-level service posi-
tions.177 The continued success of these industries will therefore be jeop-
ardized by a reduction in the local workforce.' 78
172. See id. § 1801, art. 1, § 103.
173. See Position Paper, supra note 18 (warning that the passage of the Implementa-
tion "would set back the economic clock of the Commonwealth"). See also CNAII cities
Progress at Congressional Hearings. Rep Juan N. Babuta, Reporting from Wash. The En-
forcement of Federal laws and the use of Federal funds in the Northern Mariana Islands:
Oversight Hearing Before House Conln. Onl Resources, 106th Cong. (1999 (quoting Gover-
nor Tenorio, who stated that the bill would destroy the Islands economy and return them
to an impoverished state); See Statement of Juan N. Babauta, supra note 16 (indicating that
the passage of Senate Bill 1052 would abolish all local control of immigration decisions).
174. See Position Paper, supra note 18; CNMI cities Progress at Congressional Hear-
ings. Rep Juan N. Babuta, Reporting front Wash. The Enforcement of Federal laws and the
use of Federal finds in the Northern Mariana Islands: Oversight learing Before House
Conn. On Resources, 106th Cong. (1999) (Testimony of Lynn A. Knight, Vice President,
Saipan Chamber of Commerce). T1he economic development of the Islands has merely
enhanced their quality of life. See id. Even today, the islands do not have fresh drinking
water in every home and the sewer and power systems barely meet their demands. See also
Davis, supra note 115, at 152 (stating that the imposition of the laws would wreak havoc on
the economy).
175. See Position Paper, supra note 18.
176. See The Enforcement of Federal Laws and the Use of Federal Funds in the North-
ern Mariana Islands: Oversight Hearing Before House Conln. On Resources, 106th Cong.
(1999) (Testimony of Lynn A. Knight, Vice President, Saipan Chamber of Commerce).
177. See Position Paper, supra note 18 (finding that the number of permanent citizen
workers in the labor force are out numbered by foreign workers at a ratio of three to one);
Northern Mariana Islands Covenant Inplementation Act: Hearings on S. 1275 Before tie
Comm. On Energy and Natural Resources, 105th Cong. 105-201 (1998); Davis. supra note
115, at 152.
178. See Position Paper, supra note 18. According to the document, there is not
enough "human or natural resources for economic self sufficiency" in the Islands. See id.
Likewise, it would take the Commonwealth between 70 to 90 years to produce sufficient
local workers to replace the current number of nonresident guest workers in the Common-
wealth. See id. See also Davis, supra note 115, at 152.
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B. Made in USA Label Defense Act
In addition to the Covenant Implementation Act, Congress has intro-
duced the Made in USA Label Defense Act.'79 This legislation seeks to
disallow the use of the 'Made in USA' label on products imported from
the CNMI."8 ° Furthermore, it proposes to increase tariffs on these prod-
ucts by eliminating duty free treatment in the fifty States."' This legisla-
tion would be the first of its kind to impose a tariff on a United States
territory.'82 An analyst has likened this to placing an import tax on goods
produced in Virginia or Indiana.183
The American textile industry has subjected the legislation to an inten-
sive lobbying effort.184 The textile industries blame the imported prod-
ucts for a substantial loss of business.18 5 Yet, these same textile industries
have been accused of forging a smear campaign against the Islands be-
cause they want a portion of the CNMI's one billion dollars from gar-
ments sold in the United States. 18 6
Additionally, the CNMI's government lacks a representative in Wash-
ington to lobby on its behalf.187 The CNMI claims that the Made in USA
Label Defense Act will have a negative impact on their economy.' 88 The
179. See S. 922, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 1621, 106th Cong. (1999); see also Govern-
ment Press Release, supra note 15; Hall, supra note 17.
180. See S. 922, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 1621, 106th Cong. (1999); see also Govern-
ment Press Release, supra note 15; Hall, supra note 17.
181. See S. 922, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 1621, 106th Cong. (1999); see also Govern-
ment Press Release, supra note 15; Hall, supra note 17. The rationale behind the bill is that
most of the workers in the factories are not American; therefore, they should have the
privilege of using the label. See Deborah J. Karet, Privatizing Law on the Commonwealth
of the Northern Mariana Islands: Is litigation the Best Channel for Reforming the Garment
Industry, 48 BuFi. L. REV. 1047, 1091 (2000).
182. See Hall, supra note 17; Schvey and Froning, supra note 162.
183. See Schvey and Froning, supra note 162. The taxation of United States citizens
violates the Fifth Amendment's provision that "no person shall ... be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." See U. S. CONST., amend. V.
184. See Hall, supra note 17.
185. See id.
186. See Eilperin, supra note 168. See generally Cuison, supra note 163, at 63. Con-
gressman George Miller's statement to his colleagues on capitol hill states "the time has
come to shut down these loopholes and the scam in Saipan... Companies are automating
and moving operations searching for lower taxes, special exemptions and cheaper la-
bor... these policies hurt America and its middle class." Id. The author points out that this
statement does not refer to the economic success of the Northern Mariana Islands, but the
economic losses to the United States and its middle class. See id. at 76.
187. See Hall, supra note 17.
188. Eilperin, supra note 168. See also Cuison, supra note 163, at 75. Congressman
George Miller's statement to his colleagues on capitol hill states "the time has come to shut
down these loopholes and the scam in Saipan... Companies are automating and moving
operations searching for lower taxes, special exemptions and cheaper labor... tlhese policies
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Act's requirement that imports from the Islands be taxed like that of for-
eign imports forces manufacturers to go elsewhere. Thus, imposing im-
port tariffs on local goods will increase unemployment and destroy the
Islands' ability to remain self-sustaining.18 9
Imposition of United States law on the Islands will not change the cir-
cumstances in the CNMI, due to the Islands' nominal land area, small
local population, and geographic isolation. On the contrary, the legisla-
tion will have "a critical underpinning of [the Islands'] exercise of self-
determination and self-government."19 Because the CNMI does not
have a voting member in Congress, the Act would impose taxation with-
out representation.' 9'
Although the CNMI admits there are problems with foreign labor, it
asserts that the federal government has not made a sincere endeavor to
aid in addressing the problem.' 92 When the Covenant was signed, the
United States committed to directing the experiment of self-govern-
ment. 193 Moreover, section 701 of the Covenant requires the United
States to assist the government of the Islands with their development to
self-determination.' 94 The United States has failed to provide personnel
or technical assistance to aid the CNMI effort.' 95 The CNMI's maintains
that the United States should aid in the development and implementation
of local solutions to the Islands' local problems before imposing essen-
tially foreign policies on the Islands' unique conditions96
VI. CLARIFYING THE COVENANT'S INTENT
Because the Covenant's fundamental provisions are unclear as to the
extent of United States authority to enact legislation affecting the Islands,
Congress should defer to the negotiating documents when contemplating
legislation. During the Covenant's negotiations, the United States dele-
gation, led by Ambassador F. Haydn Williams,'97 met with the Marianas
Political Status Commission in order to negotiate the final terms of the
hurt America and its middle class." Id. The author points out that this statement does not
refer to the economic success of the Northern Mariana Islands, but the economic losses to
the United States and its middle class. See id. at 76.
189. See Position Paper, supra note 18; Schavey and Froning, supra note 162.
190. See Schavey and Froning, supra note 162.
191. See id.
192. See Position Paper, supra note 18.
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. Williams was appointed Ambassador by President Nixon on June 24, 1971. See
McHENRY, supra note 23, at 103.
2000]
THE SCHOLAR
Covenant. The negotiating history of the Covenant includes transcripts
of the hearings and meetings of the negotiations.
98
The transcripts, along with the Covenant, should serve as a guide for
interpreting the Covenant, as these speeches by the United States repre-
sentatives illustrate clear promises to uphold the request for self-govern-
ment.1 99 For example, Ambassador Williams stated during the fifth and
final round of negotiations "the Northern Mariana Islands will be respon-
sible for planning its own economic future, the pace and the nature of its
economic growth, its land use, the allocation of its financial resources and
the establishment of development goals and priorities."2 ' This language
clearly demonstrates a willingness on the part of the United States to
form an agreement consistent with the self-governing principals desired
all along by the Northern Mariana Islands delegation.
The records also include speeches by members of the Marianas Politi-
cal Status Commission that clearly illustrate the Islands' desire for self-
determination.2 ' For example, when referring to specific benefits of the
Trusteeship Agreement that the people of the Northern Mariana wished
to perpetuate into the Covenant, Herman Q. Guerrero stated during
negotiations:
Under the terms of the Trusteeship Agreement, the United States
is obligated, among other things, to promote the inhabitants of the
Trust territory toward self-government, in accordance with the
freely-expressed wishes of the people concerned. This principal of
self-determination, is I feel, the most important part of the entire
Trusteeship Agreement. 20 2
Moreover, the United States' and the Islands' particular economic and
national needs of the time conspired to create a truly unique relationship.
Although drafting of the Covenant represented uncharted territory, the
negotiating history of the Covenant clearly conveys that it was intended
by both parties to be mutually beneficial. The flexible nature of the Cov-
198. See Hearing on H.J. Res. 549, H.]. Res. 550, and H.J. Res. 547, supra note 7.
199. See id.
200. See id. at 413. In addition, Ambassador Williams stated that "Itlhe Northern
Mariana Islands are not now a colony nor will they be a colony under the commonwealth
covenant. The United States was charged under the trusteeship to develop the peoples of
Micronesia toward self-governance or independence. The United Nations has recognized
self-determination to include the right of affiliation with a sovereign state and the peoples
of the Northern Mariana Islands have voluntarily chosen to seek membership in the Amer-
ican family. If the Congress approves the covenant the people of the [Nlorthern Mariana
Islands will be self-governing under their own constitution as are the States." Ild.
201. See Marianas Political Status Negotiations, Opening Round, supra note 1, at 136.
202. See id. at 160.
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enant allows certain equilibrium between "economic development and
cultural, social, and political stability.
20 3
Therefore, Congress must not make laws, which affect the Islands with-
out taking the Islands' social and cultural values into account. Protecting
social and cultural values was a key motivating factor for the Islands dur-
ing the Covenant's negotiations. The mutual consent provision was cru-
cial to protecting that right.
Moreover, the Covenant is not a document that can be interpreted on
its own because it takes so many factors into consideration. The Islands
did not become a part of the United States by accession; nor did it be-
come a Commonwealth as a result of a treaty. The Islands' status as a
Commonwealth was a result of negotiations between the United States
and the Islands. The Islands willingly gave up limited sovereignty in or-
der to retain its right to local self-government. For the United States to
unilaterally alter this right under powers only arguably conferred by the
Covenant is inherently unfair and perpetuates congressional colonialism.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Covenant has become a one-sided agreement subject to the will of
Congress, with the indigenous population no longer an important player
in defining its own destiny. The citizens of the Northern Mariana Islands
did not intend to surrender their sovereignty; at most, they intended to
give up only a portion of their sovereignty. If the Covenant's terms are
not settled, the people of the Northern Mariana Islands will never be free
to determine their destiny and will continue to be merely another territo-
rial conquest of the United States. The negotiating history makes clear
the original desires and expectations of the citizens of the Northern Mari-
ana Islands. It also makes clear that the subsequent denial of these
desires and expectations by the continued imposition of federal legisla-
tion over the Islands is nothing more than congressional colonialism.
The negotiating history of the Covenant indicates that the Covenant
was not meant to eliminate the indigenous people's freedom or their right
to self-government. The Covenant does not give the United States unbri-
dled power. The United States' continued imposition of legislation over
the Islands amounts to colonial oppression. The genius and the spirit of
the Constitution prevent such oppression for all citizens of the United
States.
203. Herald, supra note 29, at 137.
2000]

